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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case: This case involves a claim by appellants, the 
Christians, to avoid a fraudulent transfer by Robert McClung to the appellee, Mason, following 
the revelation of McClung' s operation of a Ponzi scheme in which both the Christians and 
Mason were victims. Mason received payments from McClung in excess of the amounts he 
originally was induced to give to McC!ung, while the Christians suffered a substantial loss and 
are judgment creditors ofMcClung. 
B. Course of proceedings below: The parties cross-moved for summary 
judgment. The district court dismissed the Christians' claim, concluding the claim was the 
property of the estate of McClung' s bankruptcy, and that the Clu'istians lacked standing to pursue 
the claim. This appeal followed. 
C. Statement of facts: 
This case involves a Ponzi scheme in which both parties to this case were victims. 
Defendant Mason received over $32,000 more back from the perpetrator of the scheme, Robert 
McClung (who now resides in federal prison as a result of the scheme), than he gave to 
McC!ung. Plaintiffs the Christians, who suffered a loss of almost $155,000, sued to recover 
from Mason the amount of the excess, as a fraudulent transfer by McClung. 
Christians filed their Complaint against Mason on July 20, 2006. CR 4. The first 
eight paragraphs of Christians' Complaint alleged as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs JERRY CHRISTIAN and JOY CHRISTIAN, 
husband and wife, are residents ofldaho Falls, Idaho. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS - 1 
2. Defendant DA YID MASON is a resident of Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. 
3. Plaintiffs are judgment creditors of Robert 0. McClung 
("McClung") in the amount of $154,690.80. A true and correct 
copy of the judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against McClung is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. Plaintiffs and Defendant were victims of a fraudulent 
scheme by McClung in which he purported to act as an investment 
advisor and "day-trader," soliciting funds from victims and 
representing to them that he was investing the funds on their behalf 
via day-trading. 
5. McClung provided Plaintiffs, Defendant and other victims 
with fraudulent "account statements" purporting to evidence 
investment gains. In fact, McClung engaged in virtually no trading 
of victim funds, and appropriated the funds for his own use, or to 
pay fictitious "gains" to some "investors" in a Ponzi scheme while 
the scheme remained active. 
6. In approximately July 2002, the Idaho Department of 
Finance began investigating McClung's activities. McClung's 
fictitious "account statements" provided to victims showed that he 
"quit trading" on or about July 29, 2002. He sent a letter to victims 
at the end of August, 2002, providing excuses for not currently 
trading. His last statements (that showed no "trading") were for 
August and September, 2002. 
7. On or about November 25, 2002, the Idaho Department of 
Finance initiated a civil lawsuit against McClung and entities he 
controlled as part of his fraudulent scheme seeking a judgment 
against McClung for unreturned victim funds, and to prohibit him 
from further violating the Idaho Securities Act. 
8. On or about January 25, 2005, McClung pleaded guilty in 
United States District Court to a charge of mail fraud relating to his 
fraudulent investment scheme. A true and correct copy of 
McClung's plea agreement, in which he admits the operative facts 
of his fraudulent scheme, is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
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McClung was sentenced to approximately thirty-six months in 
prison, and presently is incarcerated in a United States correctional 
facility. 
Complaint, ,r,r 1-8; CR 5-6. In his Answer, Mason responded in pertinent part: "Defendant 
David Mason ... hereby answers Plaintiffs Jerry and Joy Christian's (Christian) Complaint to 
Avoid Fraudulent transfer as follows: ... 2. Admits paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8." 
Answer, ,r 2; CR 22. Thus, Mason admitted that Christians are judgment creditors of McClung; 
that McClung perpetrated a fraudulent Ponzi scheme of which the parties were victims; that the 
account statements provided by McClung purporting to show investment gains were fraudulent; 
that McClung engaged in virtually no trading of "investor" funds, and appropriated the funds for 
his own use, or to pay fictitious "gains" to some victims; that McClung ultimately pleaded guilty 
to mail fraud as a result of his scheme; and that copy ofMcClung's plea agreement, in which he 
admitted the operative facts of his fraudulent scheme, was true and correct. 
In his plea agreement, 1 McClung admitted as follows: 
The defendant assured Mr. Christian and other investors that their 
investment would be at minimal risk because all transactions 
would be closed out before the end of the close of business. The 
defendant further represented to Mr. Christian and other investors 
that they could earn three percent (3%) return per month on their 
investment. The defendant showed investors, including Mr. 
McClung's plea agreement is also publicly available via the ECF and PACER systems for 
accessing the files of the United States District Court for the District ofldaho, as Document 13 filed in case number 
CR 04-0241-E-BLW. Idaho Rule of Evidence 20l(b) provides that a court may lake judicial notice of a fact when 
the fact is capable of accurate detennination by resort to sources whose accuracy caunot reasonably be questioned. 
A court must lake judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information. I.R.E. 201 ( d). 
Judicial notice may be laken at any stage of a proceeding. I.R.E. 201 ( f). Even absent Mason's admission regarding 
the accuracy of the plea agreement, the district court could and should have taken judicial notice of it and its 
contents. 
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Christian, monthly statements with consistent earnings and no 
losses. . . . Mr. Christian and other investors would not have 
provided the defendant with investment funds had they known the 
defendant would misapply investment funds to his own personal 
use. Nor would Mr. Christian have invested monies when the 
defendant was not, in fact, realizing profits from his purported 
day trading. The evidence would show that defendant conducted 
day trading on only thirty-two (32) days during 2000, 2001, and 
2002, not on a daily or regular basis as he represented to investors. 
Further more, the defendant received approximately $1.7 
million from approximately one hundred investors and caused 
investors to lose $1.1 million. . . . The defendant misapplied a 
substantial sum of said investment proceeds to his own personal 
use. 
Complaint, Ex. B, pp. 1-2 (emphasis added); CR 14-15. Thus, McC!ung admitted that his 
scheme did not produce "earnings," but that he was diverting funds to his personal use, and that 
over $1 million of his victims' money was unaccounted for. 
Following the revelation of his Ponzi scheme, McClung filed for bankruptcy. On 
October 14, 2004, the Christians obtained a judgment against him in the bankruptcy proceeding 
in the amount of $154,690.80. CR 8-9. The judgment reflected that the Christians' claims 
against McClung were nondischargeable. CR 9. 
McClung was sentenced to 37 months in federal prison for his crimes. Affidavit 
of Michael Christian ("Christian Affidavit"), Ex. A; CR 118. He served his sentence as an 
inmate in federal prison in Elkton, Ohio. Christian Affidavit, Ex. B; CR 126-127. 
Unlike the Christians, Mason received $32,873.12 more from McClung than he 
provided to him. Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (David Mason), ,i 7; 
CR 66. Mason admitted that he "invested" various amounts with McClung. Mason Affidavit, 
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,r,r 4, 5; CR 66. His affidavit, and the "account statements" attached to his affidavit, the accuracy 
of which he acknowledged, showed total additions of $166,042.06 and total withdrawals of 
$198,915.18, resulting in excess payments to Mason of$32,873.12. Mason Affidavit, ,r 4 and 
Ex. B; CR 66, 68-88.2 The excess was included in the last payments to Mason of $14,000 on 
July 22, 2002, $709.13 on July 29, 2002, and $30,905.06 on October 2, 2002. CR 27, 49, 66, 68, 
86. Mason acknowledged the dates and amounts of these withdrawals in his brief in support of 
his own summary judgment motion. CR 27. 
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. Mason initially asserted, 
without substantiation, that any excess "in Mason's account" actually belonged to his father, and 
that he only "invested for" his father. CR 66; CR 27. No corroborating evidence of any kind 
supported these conclusory assertions. Whether he ultimately owed the money to his father is 
irrelevant, however, if Mason was the transferee of money from McClung. In briefing on the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, Mason acknowledged that he was the transferee. 
CR 27 ("After November 2001, reported earnings continued to be withdrawn each month and 
eventually the principal was paid back to Mason by McClung."). Mason also admitted that the 
money "was invested with Mr. McC!ung under my name." Mason Affidavit, ,r 6; CR 66. The 
documents attached to Mason's affidavit showed that from May of2001 on, only David Mason 
dealt with McCiung, and money was paid by McC!ung to David Mason himself. Mason 
Affidavit, Ex. B; CR 68-88. Documents produced by Mason in discovery showed that, on the 
2 Mason's own accounting, attached as Exhlbit A to his affidavit, erroneously omitted the$ 1,476.18 he 
received from McC!ung in September 2001, as reflected in the "account statement" for that period. CR 76. 
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dates corresponding to the excess payments of$14,000 on July 22, 2002 and $30,905.06 October 
2, 2002, David Mason wrote checks from the checking account for his business to an investment 
account owned by him, for $14,000 and $30,000, respectively. Christian Affidavit, Ex. C; CR 
128-132. Finally, checks for the disputed transfers (and other transfers from McClung which 
Mason asserted were "withdrawals" made by his father) were made payable to David Mason, not 
to his father. CR 105-111. In its Opinion, Decision and Order dismissing the Christians' claim, 
the district court found that "Mason gave McClung $166,042.06 and received $198,915.08, a net 
gain of$32,873.12." CR 146. David Mason was the transferee of the excess payments. 
Mason also asserted without substantiation that the last payments McClung made 
to him were "returns of principal," and that earlier payments to him were "earnings" on his 
"investment." Mason Affidavit, ,r 7; CR 66. As further discussed below, in a Ponzi scheme, 
there are no "earnings" -- the scheme is based on a fraudulent report of "earnings" to induce 
victims to provide more money. McClung's guilty plea established this fact, as did Mason's 
admissions in response to the key allegations of the Christians' Complaint. CR 15, 22. They and 
the judgment of the bankruptcy court established that any payments to Mason were not 
"earnings" but were, to the extent in excess of money provided by Mason to McClung, 
fraudulent transfers of money owed to others, including the Christians. 
Following the hearing on the parties' motions, the district court ruled, essentially 
sua sponte, that Christians lacked standing to pursue their fraudulent transfer claim against 
Mason. The Court concluded that the claim belonged exclusively to the bankruptcy estate, and 
that the state law fraudulent transfer claim was therefore preempted by federal law. CR 146-151. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS - 6 
In part, the district court ruled that because the bankruptcy trustee had not pursued a fraudulent 
transfer claim against Mason within two years pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548, "[a]Ilowing Plaintiffs 
an alternate route around the limitations found in the bankruptcy code would only serve to 
circumvent the process and frustrate the orderly administration of the bankruptcy estate." CR 
150. 
McClung' s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, District of Idaho Bankruptcy Court, Case 
No. 03-40682, was filed on April 16, 2003. The trustee was appointed in the Chapter 11 case on 
April 17, 2003, and again on October 17, 2003 after the case was converted to a Chapter 7 
proceeding. 3 As noted, the Christians received their judgment against McClung from the 
bankruptcy court on October 14, 2004. The bankruptcy trustee apparently took essentially no 
action to pursue recovery ofMcC!ung's excess payment to Mason. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Do Christians have standing to pursue their fraudulent transfer claim 
against Mason, where the trustee in the fraudulent transferor's bankruptcy failed to timely pursue 
the claim and the bankruptcy is closed? 
McClung's bankruptcy case records are publicly available via the ECF and PACER systems for 
accessing the files of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, in case number 03-40682. The 
court may take judicial notice of a fact when the fact is capable of accurate determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. I.R.E. 201(b). Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of a proceeding. 
I.R.E. 20l(f); Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337, 340 (Ct. App. 1989). Given its reliance upon the existence of 
McClung's bankruptcy case, the district court could and should have taken judicial notice of its records. This Court 
also should take judicial notice of those records. 
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2. Should the district court have granted summary judgment to the Christians 
on their fraudulent transfer claim, since Mason admitted the essential elements of the claim and 
no genuine issue of material fact remained? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of review. 
This court reviews the district court's rulings on issues of law de novo. Basic 
American, Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734 (1999). A ruling on a motion for motion for 
summary judgment is an issue of law reviewed de novo. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660,662 (2005). 
B. The district court erred by ruling that the fraudulent 
transfer claim against Mason was the property of 
McClung's bankruptcy estate and could not be pursued 
by McClung's creditors. 
A trustee in bankruptcy may avoid fraudulent transfers made by the debtor. 11 
U.S.C. §548. The pre-BAPCPA version of 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) in effect at the time ofMcClung's 
banlcruptcy limited the time for the trustee to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim against Mason 
to: 
the earlier of-
(1) the later of --
(A) 2 years after the entry of the order for relief; or 
(B) 1 year after the appointment or election of the first trustee 
under section 702, 1104, 1163, 1202, or 1302 of this title [11 
uses§ 702, 1104, 1163, 1202, or 1302] if such appointment or 
such election occurs before the expiration of the period specified in 
subparagraph (A); or 
(2) the time the case is closed or dismissed. 
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The "order for relief' is the petition for bankruptcy in a voluntary bankruptcy 
case. 11 U.S.C. § 301; In re Smith, 235 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 2000). 
As noted, McClung's bankruptcy petition was filed on April 16, 2003. A trustee 
was appointed on April 17, 2003, and again on October 17, 2003 following conversion of the 
case from a Chapter 11 proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Thus, even giving 11 U.S.C. § 
546(a)(l) a liberal interpretation, the trustee's ability to pursue recovery of the excess transfer to 
Mason expired no later than one year after the appointment of the trustee following conversion 
of the case, or October 17, 2004. 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the trustee's abandonment of the claim 
did not extinguish or preempt individual creditors' claims to avoid the same fraudulent transfer. 
Nothing in either the Bankruptcy Code or the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides for this 
result. To the contrary, numerous courts have recognized that once the trustee fails to timely 
pursue a fraudulent transfer claim, creditors of the bankruptcy debtor are free to pursue their own 
claims against the excess transferee, exactly as the Christians did. 
For example, in Klingman v. Levinson, 158 B.R. 109 (N.D. Ill. 1993), Levinson, 
an attorney, embezzled money from his clients. Klingman sued to have Levinson's assignment 
of an interest in a trust to his wife set aside as a fraudulent transfer. Levinson filed for 
bankruptcy, and Levinson's debt to Klingman for the embezzlement was held to be 
nondischargeable.4 Klingman's action was removed to the federal court, and then removed to 
4 The same is true ofMcC!ung's debt to the Christians; its nondischargeability is expressly stated in the 
Christians' judgment against McC!ung. 
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the bankruptcy court following Levinson's bankruptcy filing. Levinson and his wife them 
moved for summary judgment, making exactly the same argument as relied upon by the Court in 
this case, contending that Klingman "Jack[ ed] standing to pursue [the] fraudulent conveyance 
action because once Melvin filed his bankruptcy petition, the allegedly fraudulently conveyed 
property became part of the debtor's estate, and only the trustee has standing to assert this cause 
of action." 158 B.R. at 112. The district court rejected the argument. While noting that the 
bankruptcy trustee initially has the exclusive right to pursue fraudulently conveyed assets of the 
debtor, the court stated: 
However, the trustee does not retain this exclusive right in 
perpetuity. The trustee's exclusive right to maintain a fraudulent 
conveyance action expires and creditors may step in ( or resume 
actions) when the trustee no longer has a viable cause of action. 
Kathy B. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 1413, 1415 
(9th Cir. 1986) (IRS entitled to pursue collection action after 
bankruptcy closed); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp .. 733 F.2d 
1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1984) ("once a bankruptcy case has been 
closed, creditors having unavoided liens on fraudulently conveyed 
property can pursue their state law remedies independently of the 
trustee in bankruptcy"); Dixon v. Bennett, 72 Md. App. 620, 531 
A.2d 1318, 1323-25 (1987) ("once a trustee's statutory time period 
has expired, an unsecured creditor can bring an action against a 
fraudulent transferee under state law provided the state statute of 
limitations has not yet expired"), cert denied, 311 Md. 557, 536 
A.2d 664 (1988). 
Here, there is no dispute that the trustee never sought to recover 
the conveyance challenged by Klingman and the United States.5 
The statute of limitations has long since run on the trustee's right 
to bring that action. The court finds that Klingman and the United 
States have standing to pursue their claims in this action. 
The United States had intervened in Klingrnan's action to satisfy a tax debt of Levinson. 
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158 B.R. at 113. 
See also Barber v. Westbay. 313 B.R. 419, 427 (C.D. Ill. 2004) ("The landscape 
changes, however, once it is determined that the trustee's claim is no longer viable. A creditor 
regains standing to pursue a state fraudulent conveyance action, in its own name and for its own 
benefit, once the statute of limitations expires on the bankruptcy trustee's right to bring the 
claim."); Casey Nat'l Bank v. Roan, 668 N.E.2d 608, 612-13 (Ill. App. 1996) ("While the trustee 
has the exclusive right to pursue fraudulently conveyed assets pursuant to section 546(a) of the 
Code once bankruptcy has been initiated (11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1988)), the trustee loses that right 
and creditors may step in once the trustee longer has a viable cause of action (in this case 
because the statute of limitations for initiating a cause for fraudulent conveyance had expired as 
to the trustee"). 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion by rejecting similar arguments, 
among them that a creditor is barred by res judicata from pursuing a state law fraudulent transfer 
claim following a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy. 
In Roberson v. Johnson, 950 So.2d 317 (Ala. App. 2006), Roberson loaned 
Johnsons $60,000. Johnsons transferred $10,000 to Fred, and shortly thereafter filed for 
bankruptcy. Johnsons listed the debt owed to Roberson in their schedule of debts. Johnson's 
debt to Roberson was eventually discharged. Roberson then sued Fred in state court to avoid the 
$10,000 transfer from Johnson to Fred as a fraudulent transfer. Fred moved for sUllllllary 
judgment, asserting that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter and had 
discharged Johnson's debt to Roberson, fully disposing of the matter. The trial court granted 
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Fred's motion, but the appellate court reversed. In doing so, the court reasoned that the 
discharge provision of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) "had no effect on Roberson's rights with 
regard to the alleged fraudulent transfer to Fred. 950 So.2d 321 (citing National Union Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Grusky, 763 So.2d 1206, 1208-9 (Fla. App. 2000) (holding similarly). Roberson was 
allowed to continue pursuing his fraudulent transfer claim against Fred. 
1n Grusky. Elliot defaulted on a loan from Lawrence, and was indebted to 
National Union. By the time he defaulted on Lawrence's loan, National Union was already a 
judgment creditor of Elliot. Elliot transferred stock to Lawrence, then filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. National Union urged the trustee to avoid the transfer to Lawrence, but the trustee 
chose not to. National Union then filed suit against Lawrence in state court to avoid the transfer. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Lawrence, ruling in part that National Union was 
barred by res judicata because of the bankruptcy court proceedings, and had no standing because 
it was no longer a creditor, Elliot's debt to it having been discharged in bankruptcy. The 
appellate court reversed, reasoning: (a) that National Union was not barred by res judicata, since 
the fraudulent transfer action was never litigated in the bankruptcy court; and (b) National Union 
had standing because discharge granted to the debtor under § 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code 
expressly "does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity 
for, such debt." 763 So.2d at 1208. The court stated that§ 524(e) "reveals a congressional intent 
to broaden the rights of creditors, by preserving their actions against third parties and their 
property, and to restrict the effect of a discharge solely to a release of the personal property of 
the debtor." Id. At 1209. The court also emphasized that "the present action is brought against 
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Lawrence and not against Elliot, the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding," and since National 
Union constituted a "creditor" under the UFTA, "[e]ven though National Union's claim against 
Elliot was discharged in bankruptcy, the claim against Lawrence, a third party, was still viable." 
Id. 
See also Kathy B. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 1413, 1414 (9th Cir. 
1986) (holding that the debtor's discharge did not affect a fraudulent transferee's liability for the 
same debt, and stating: "We see no reason to infer an exception to clear statutory language for 
the benefit of recipients of fraudulent conveyances. . . . The bankruptcy proceedings are over. 
Even if the government's actions did violate the stay, it will be permitted to pursue collection 
actions now."); Dwyer v. Meramec Venture Assoc., 75 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Mo. App. 2002) ("[A) 
debtor's discharge in bankruptcy does not protect fraudulent transferees from collection efforts 
by a judgment creditor. To permit a bankrupt debtor to shield his assets by engaging in a 
fraudulent transfer would result in a windfall to the fraudulent transferees at the expense of the 
unprotected creditor. We cannot permit the debtor to do indirectly what the law forbids him to 
do directly."). 
In Clark v. Bank of Bentonville, 824 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Ark. 1992), the Arkansas 
Supreme Court ruled that a bank could pursue a fraudulent transfer claim after the trustee in the 
transferor debtor's bankruptcy failed to do so. The Court stated in pertinent part: 
Appellants further argue that res judicata should bar the bank's 
fraudulent conveyance action because the claim was not pursued in 
the bankruptcy proceeding. However, the bankruptcy code does 
not give a creditor the power to pursue a cause of action to set 
aside a fraudulent conveyance. [Citation omitted). In fact, 11 
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U.S.C. § 362(a) imposes an automatic stay that prohibits creditors 
form acting against a debtor's property during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. [Citation omitted]. While a trustee may 
elect to pursue a creditor's unsecured state law claim under 11 
U.S.C. § 544(b) ... such an action is an exercise of the avoidance 
power for the benefit of all creditors. Since the bank did not have 
standing as a single creditor to pnrsue the fraudulent conveyance 
action during the bankruptcy proceeding, Id., res ;udicata did not 
prohibit the bank's subseguent state court action. 
824 S.W.2d at 361 (emphasis added). 
The Christians were entitled to pursue their fraudulent transfer claim against 
Mason once the trustee in McClung's bankruptcy lost the right to do so, and the trustee's 
abandonment of his claim had no effect on the continued viability of the Christians' separate 
state law claim against Mason. The district court erred in dismissing the Christians' claim on 
this basis. 
C. No genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the 
existence of a fraudulent transfer, and the district court 
should have granted summary judgment to the 
Christians. 
Because the essential facts were not in dispute, and no genuine issue of material 
fact remained, the district court should have denied Mason's motion for summary judgment, and 
instead granted the Christians summary judgment. 
1. Summary judgment standards. 
Summary judgment may be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also 
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Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434,438,660 P.2d 46 (1982); Collard v. Cooley, 92 Idaho 789,791,451 
P.2d 535 (I 969). The purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to eliminate the necessity of 
trial of a claim or defense where existent and undisputed facts lead to a conclusion of law which 
is certain. Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,444,690 P.2d 896 (1984). Summary judgment is an 
appropriate tool to eliminate groundless defenses in cases which would end in directed verdicts 
or other rnlings oflaw. Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., Inc., 97 Idaho 805, 806, 554 P .2d 1302 (1976). 
If uncontroverted facts exist which lead to definite disposition as a matter of law, summary 
judgment may be granted. G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 
851 (1991). 
A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 
prevent summary judgment. Stafford v. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223, 225 (2001). The non-moving 
party must respond to a summary judgment motion with "specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Id. 
Under Rule 56( e ), conclusory assertions, made without substantiation by 
underlying facts in the record, do not create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Where an affidavit merely states conclusions and does not set out 
facts, such supporting affidavit is inadmissible to show the absence 
of a genuine issue of material fact. Matthews v. New York Life 
Insurance Co., 92 Idaho 372, 443 P.2d 456 (1968). Accord, 
Openshaw v. Allstate Insurance Co., 94 Idaho 192,484 P.2d 1032 
(1971). 
A supporting affidavit is inadmissible to show the presence of a 
genuine issue of material fact if it merely states conclusions and 
does not set out the underlying facts. See also Corbridge v. Clark 
Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986) 
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(affidavit not establishing specific facts "is precisely the type of 
flawed affidavit contemplated by I.R.C.P. 56(e)"); Wright, Miller 
& Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil (Second) § 2738 
(1983) (ultimate or conclusory facts cannot be utilized on a 
summary judgment motion). 
Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 508, 600 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1979); See also Jerome 
Thriftway Drug v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615, 618 (1986) ("Unsupported general or conclusory 
allegations are not sufficient in the face of a motion for summary judgment[.]"); Hecla Mining 
Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 786 (affidavits which are "conclusory" and not 
supported by "specific facts" do not satisfy the requirements of competency and admissibility 
under Rule 56(e) and cannot prevent summary judgment); State v. Shama Resources L.P., 127 
Idaho 267,271 (1995) ("The requirements of Rule 56(e) are not satisfied by an affidavit that is 
conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge."). 
Similarly, internally inconsistent testimony or affidavit testimony which 
contradicts a p1ior admission cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. See, ll.&, U.S. v. 
1980 Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d 477, 480 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1987) (self-contradictory deposition testimony 
could not raise genuine issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment); Buie v. 
Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 506 (ih Cir. 2004 (stating that, on motion for summary 
judgment, "internally contradictory affidavits are generally disfavored."). 
2. The excess payments by McClung to Mason were 
fraudulent transfers. 
Idaho's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides in pertinent part: 
"Every transfer of property ... with intent to delay or defraud any creditor or other person of 
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his demands, is void against all creditors of the debtor and their successors in interest[.]'' LC.§ 
55-906 ( emphasis added). A transfer6 is fraudulent, whether the creditor's claim arose before or 
after the transfer was made, if: 
(a) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor7 of the 
debtor; or 
(b) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation, and the debtor: 
1. was engaged or about to engage in a business or transaction 
for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in 
relation to the business or transaction; or 
2. intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have 
believed that he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay 
as they became due. 
LC.§ 55-913(l)(a), (b). 
Additionally, a transfer is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the 
transfer was made if the debtor made the transfer without receiving a "reasonably equivalent 
value" in exchange for the transfer and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became 
insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. § 55-914(1 ). 
Once found to exist, a fraudulent transfer may be avoided. LC. § 55-916(l)(a). 
Judgment may be awarded against the transferee in favor of the creditor seeking avoidance of the 
transfer, in the amount of the transfer. LC. § 55-917(2)(a). 
6 A "transfer" includes the payment of money. J.C.§ 55-910(12). 
A "creditor" is a person who has a "claim" I.C. § 55-910(4). A "claim" is a right to payment, whether or 
not reduced to judgment, liquidated, un!iquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, umnatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured or unsecured. J.C. § 55-910(3). As noted, Christians are judgment creditors of McClnng, 
but nuder the definitions of the Act, had a "claim" and were "creditors" of McCluug once they had provided money 
to him as a result of his fraud. 
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Several courts have held that actual intent to defraud may be inferred by the 
"mere existence of a Ponzi scheme," such that excess payments to victims of a Ponzi scheme 
constitute fraudulent transfers by the perpetrator of the scheme. In re Agricultural Research And 
Technology Group. Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 535 (9 th Cir. 1990). There is a general rule -- known as 
the "Ponzi scheme presumption" -- that such a scheme demonstrates "actual intent" as matter of 
Jaw because "transfers made in the course of a Ponzi scheme could have been made for no 
purpose other than to hinder, delay or defraud creditors." In re Manhattan Fund Ltd., 359 B.R. at 
517-18; see also Drenis v. Haligiannis, 452 F. Supp. 2d 418, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Old 
Naples Securities, Inc., 343 B.R. 310, 320 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (collecting other decisions); 
Warfield v. Carnie. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27610, *28 (N.D. Tex., April 13, 2007) ("Under the 
UFTA, a debtor's actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud is conclusively established by proving 
that the debtor operated as a Ponzi scheme."). This is obvious from the character of a Ponzi 
scheme: each payment to a victim of fictitious "earnings" is actually a transfer of some other 
victim's money, and is necessarily done to "hinder, delay, or defraud" all other victims to the 
extent of the payment. McClung's guilty plea to a charge of mail fraud is direct evidence of his 
actual intent to defraud. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 
1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the elements of mail fraud include the specific intent to 
deceive or defraud). 
Similarly, courts have held that a Ponzi scheme victim rece1vmg an excess 
payment received no value, Jet alone "reasonably equivalent value," for excess payments from 
the perpetrator of the scheme. See,~, United States v. Frykholm, 362 F.3d 413,417 (ih Cir. 
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2004); In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 595 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1991) (where an "investor" 
receives more than his total "investment" from the debtor, "(s]uch excess amounts would be 
avoidable because the debtor would not have received reasonably equivalent value for them."). 
Finally, by nmning a Ponzi scheme and promising "investor" victims high rates 
of "return," the perpetrator of the scheme obviously knows or should know that he is incurring 
debts far greater than his ability to pay. Indeed, courts have uniformly held that a Ponzi scheme 
is insolvent.from its inception. E.g .. Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551,558 (5th Cir. 2006) (Ponzi 
scheme "is, as a matter of law, insolvent from its inception."); Quilling v. 3D Mktg., LLC, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24914, *6 (N.D. Tex., Feb. 8, 2007) (same); Terry v. June, 432 F. Supp. 2d 
635, 640 (W.D. Va 2006) (same). This fact established the insolvency element of the 
Christians' claims under LC. §§ 55-913(l)(b) and 55-914(1). It did not affect Christians' claim 
under LC. § 55-913(I)(a), which requires only a transfer with the actual intend to hinder, delay 
or defraud any creditor. 
The material facts are undisputed, largely as a result of Mason's admissions in 
response to the Christians' Complaint, and satisfy the required elements under LC. 55-913(1) and 
55-914(1). As a result, the district court should have ruled as a matter of law that the excess 
transfers to Mason were fraudulent transfers, that the transfers could be avoided, and that 
judgment in the amount of the excess be entered against Mason: 
I. Mason admitted that McCJung operated and pleaded guilty to operating an 
illegal Ponzi scheme, of which he and the Christians were victims. 
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2. The existence of the scheme conclusively established McClung's actual 
intent to defraud his creditors, and his insolvency at the time the excess transfers were made. 
3. Mason admitted that Christians were creditors ofMcClung. 
4. Mason admitted that monies were provided to McClung in his name. 
5. Mason admitted, through his own accounting and the "account statements" 
attached to his affidavit, that McClung paid back $32,873.12 more than was provided to him. 
6. Because the excess payments were beyond the amounts Mason provided 
to McClung, McC!ung received no value for them, let alone "reasonably equivalent" value. 
While Mason asserted (without substantiation) that the transfers in question 
involved money belonging to his father, these conclusory assertions did not satisfy Rule 56( e ). 
Mason's own documents established that the fraudulent transfers were made to him, not to his 
father. 
While it is relevant only to a claim under LC. §55-914(1), the fact of McClung's 
insolvency and the fraudulent nature of his Ponzi scheme means that the Christians have been 
"creditors" of McClung with a "claim" against him since their first investment with him. See 
LC. § 55-910(3), (4). It is undisputed that their payments to McClung were complete before 
McClung made the excess transfers to Mason. The timing of their creditor status is irrelevant to 
their claims under LC.§ 55-913(1)(a) and §55-913(1)(b). 
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3. Mason could not avail himself of the good faith 
defense under J.C. § 55-917, because the defense: 
(1) does not apply to voiding of a transfer under 
I.C. § 55-913(1)(b); (2) does not apply to voiding 
of a transfer under I.C. § 55-914(1); and (3) does 
not apply to the voiding of a transfer under I.e. 
§55-913(1}(b) where the transferee did not also 
give reasonably equivalent value. 
Mason argued below that good faith is a defense under LC. § 55-917 to a claim 
for fraudulent transfer under LC. §55-913(l)(a). This is true, however, only if the transferee also 
gave "reasonably equivalent value." J.C. § 55-917(1) provides in pertinent part that a "transfer 
or obligation is not voidable under section 55-913(l)(a), Idaho Code, against a person who took 
in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value[.]" Because as a matter of law Mason did 
not give reasonably equivalent value for the excess transfers, his good faith is irrelevant. The 
defense does not apply to claims under LC.§ 55-913(l)(b) or §55-914(1). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in ruling that the Christians lacked standing to pursue their 
fraudulent transfer claim against Mason. Mason admitted all of the facts essential to the 
Christians' claim, and no genuine issue of material fact remained. The district court should have 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Christians. Its ruling should be reversed and 
judgment should be entered in favor of the Christians in the amount of the excess transfers to 
Mason, $32,873.12. 
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Dated this 21 st day of August, 2008. 
MARCUS, CHRISTIAN & HARDEE, LLC 
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1c ae shan 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS - 22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 21 st day of August, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS in the above-referenced matter by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
David A. Johnson, Esq. 
Wright, Wright & Johnson, PLLC 
477 Shoup Avenue, Suite 109 
PO Box 52251 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-2251 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS - 23 
HAND DELIVER 
---:::r- US. MAIL 
_--0-__ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
___ TELECOPY (FAX) 
